blob: c7e98c1bd522a571ffc7b938a871d669681aedb1 [file] [view]
# AI-generated security bugs FAQ
Chrome Security Team, April 2026
AI models are getting increasingly good at finding and exploiting security
vulnerabilities, and it is vital that we find and fix these bugs sooner than
attackers can. As such, all Chrome engineering teams are and will be seeing an
influx of security bugs generated by AI models, both externally submitted (via
our Vulnerability Rewards Program) as well as internally generated.
In this document, we respond to frequently asked questions regarding this
situation.
Googlers can also refer to the [internal
version](http://go/chrome-ai-generated-security-bugs-faq) of this FAQ.
---
## What is the current guidance for remediating security bugs?
For now, please prioritize remediating:
* S0 security bugs within 1 week
* S1 security bugs within 4 weeks
For more information, please see [go/chrome-slo](http://go/chrome-slo).
---
## What if I disagree with the severity of my security bug?
Not all AI-generated security bugs have had their severity confirmed by a member
of the Chrome Security team. As such, if you have familiarized yourself with
[Severity Guidelines for Security
Issues](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/HEAD/docs/security/severity-guidelines.md)
and you believe the severity of your bug is incorrect, please change it to what
you believe is correct and add a justification comment along with the change.
---
## Why are some of these reports invalid? How do I get fewer invalid reports?
You can improve the AI tools' ability to understand your code and discourage it
from filing invalid bugs.
Adding a `SECURITY.md` file to your directory that describes your security
boundaries will be read by the tools and will cause bugs to be filtered out
based on this. You can refer to examples in the [code
base](https://source.chromium.org/search?q=f:SECURITY.md&ss=chromium), or even
get Gemini to help you write one if you explain your security boundaries to it.
This is documented in
[security-for-agents](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/docs/security/security-for-agents.md#further-reading),
and can help weed out attacks you don't consider possible. The Chrome Security
team can also help if you have any questions about security boundaries.
Closing invalid bugs is also helpful. We periodically use bugs marked as Working
as Intended or Not Reproducible as training and evaluation cases for improving
AI based tooling.
---
## Why don't the bug reports have a Proof Of Concept (POC)?
This is actively being worked on most issues now have POCs attached as a
follow-up step to the initial report, but you still might see some without a
full POC.
Regardless of the POC being there or not, we ask you to initially treat this as
a full security issue.
---
## How should we handle bugs behind disabled feature flags?
Bugs behind disabled feature flags are only launch-blocking. Please add the bug
to the [Security_Impact-None](https://b.corp.google.com/hotlists/5433277)
hotlist (hotlistid: 5433277) to disable SLO tracking, or leave a comment if you
do not have access. Note that features available via an active Origin Trial are
considered shipped.
---
## My bug seems like a duplicate, should I close it?
If you happen to be aware of or have access to existing duplicates, feel free to
mark AI-generated security bugs as duplicates, or mark other bugs as duplicates
of them.
However, don't worry about searching widely for duplicates – unless you have
security bug access, which is restricted to members of the Chrome Security team,
existing duplicate bugs filed in other components or areas may not be visible to
you.
---
## What if I can't fix the bug because the root cause is in an external dependency?
If a vulnerability requires an external third party to fix their code, and we
can't patch around the vulnerability as a temporary fix, mark the bug with the
[Status_ExternalDependency](https://b.corp.google.com/hotlists/5438152) hotlist
(hotlistid: 5438152), or leave a comment if you do not have access.
---
## Do AI-generated security bugs have special requirements around being made public?
No, we should treat these in the same way and with the same care as
human-reported vulnerabilities. They will be made public 14 weeks after being
fixed. It is OK to make a bug public if it's determined that it's not a
vulnerability (i.e., the report describes a functional bug instead).
---
## How should I think about fixing vulnerabilities vs the underlying functional bugs that may lead to vulnerabilities?
For certain types of vulnerabilities, e.g., memory-safety issues, it may be
desirable to quickly mitigate the security issue without solving all related
functional issues. For example, if a bug describes hitting a DCHECK (which could
be triggered by a compromised renderer), a security mitigation fix would be to
convert that to a CHECK.
See [go/security-mitigation-explainer](http://go/security-mitigation-explainer)
for some possible security mitigation fixes. If you land a security mitigation
fix, you can close a bug. A follow-up bug to fix the underlying logic issue
could then be filed, but will be lower-priority than addressing other open S0s
and S1s.
---
## Can Chrome Security help answer a question about a bug assigned to me?
We're here to help, but please do not assign the bug to a Chrome Security team
member or security@chromium.org. Instead, reach out over chat to one of the
[current shepherds](http://go/current-security-shepherds) or email
security@chromium.org directly.