| # AI-generated security bugs FAQ |
| Chrome Security Team, April 2026 |
| |
| AI models are getting increasingly good at finding and exploiting security |
| vulnerabilities, and it is vital that we find and fix these bugs sooner than |
| attackers can. As such, all Chrome engineering teams are and will be seeing an |
| influx of security bugs generated by AI models, both externally submitted (via |
| our Vulnerability Rewards Program) as well as internally generated. |
| |
| In this document, we respond to frequently asked questions regarding this |
| situation. |
| |
| Googlers can also refer to the [internal |
| version](http://go/chrome-ai-generated-security-bugs-faq) of this FAQ. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## What is the current guidance for remediating security bugs? |
| |
| For now, please prioritize remediating: |
| |
| * S0 security bugs within 1 week |
| * S1 security bugs within 4 weeks |
| |
| For more information, please see [go/chrome-slo](http://go/chrome-slo). |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## What if I disagree with the severity of my security bug? |
| |
| Not all AI-generated security bugs have had their severity confirmed by a member |
| of the Chrome Security team. As such, if you have familiarized yourself with |
| [Severity Guidelines for Security |
| Issues](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/HEAD/docs/security/severity-guidelines.md) |
| and you believe the severity of your bug is incorrect, please change it to what |
| you believe is correct and add a justification comment along with the change. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## Why are some of these reports invalid? How do I get fewer invalid reports? |
| |
| You can improve the AI tools' ability to understand your code and discourage it |
| from filing invalid bugs. |
| |
| Adding a `SECURITY.md` file to your directory that describes your security |
| boundaries will be read by the tools and will cause bugs to be filtered out |
| based on this. You can refer to examples in the [code |
| base](https://source.chromium.org/search?q=f:SECURITY.md&ss=chromium), or even |
| get Gemini to help you write one if you explain your security boundaries to it. |
| This is documented in |
| [security-for-agents](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/main/docs/security/security-for-agents.md#further-reading), |
| and can help weed out attacks you don't consider possible. The Chrome Security |
| team can also help if you have any questions about security boundaries. |
| |
| Closing invalid bugs is also helpful. We periodically use bugs marked as Working |
| as Intended or Not Reproducible as training and evaluation cases for improving |
| AI based tooling. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## Why don't the bug reports have a Proof Of Concept (POC)? |
| |
| This is actively being worked on – most issues now have POCs attached as a |
| follow-up step to the initial report, but you still might see some without a |
| full POC. |
| |
| Regardless of the POC being there or not, we ask you to initially treat this as |
| a full security issue. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## How should we handle bugs behind disabled feature flags? |
| |
| Bugs behind disabled feature flags are only launch-blocking. Please add the bug |
| to the [Security_Impact-None](https://b.corp.google.com/hotlists/5433277) |
| hotlist (hotlistid: 5433277) to disable SLO tracking, or leave a comment if you |
| do not have access. Note that features available via an active Origin Trial are |
| considered shipped. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## My bug seems like a duplicate, should I close it? |
| |
| If you happen to be aware of or have access to existing duplicates, feel free to |
| mark AI-generated security bugs as duplicates, or mark other bugs as duplicates |
| of them. |
| |
| However, don't worry about searching widely for duplicates – unless you have |
| security bug access, which is restricted to members of the Chrome Security team, |
| existing duplicate bugs filed in other components or areas may not be visible to |
| you. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## What if I can't fix the bug because the root cause is in an external dependency? |
| |
| If a vulnerability requires an external third party to fix their code, and we |
| can't patch around the vulnerability as a temporary fix, mark the bug with the |
| [Status_ExternalDependency](https://b.corp.google.com/hotlists/5438152) hotlist |
| (hotlistid: 5438152), or leave a comment if you do not have access. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## Do AI-generated security bugs have special requirements around being made public? |
| |
| No, we should treat these in the same way and with the same care as |
| human-reported vulnerabilities. They will be made public 14 weeks after being |
| fixed. It is OK to make a bug public if it's determined that it's not a |
| vulnerability (i.e., the report describes a functional bug instead). |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## How should I think about fixing vulnerabilities vs the underlying functional bugs that may lead to vulnerabilities? |
| |
| For certain types of vulnerabilities, e.g., memory-safety issues, it may be |
| desirable to quickly mitigate the security issue without solving all related |
| functional issues. For example, if a bug describes hitting a DCHECK (which could |
| be triggered by a compromised renderer), a security mitigation fix would be to |
| convert that to a CHECK. |
| |
| See [go/security-mitigation-explainer](http://go/security-mitigation-explainer) |
| for some possible security mitigation fixes. If you land a security mitigation |
| fix, you can close a bug. A follow-up bug to fix the underlying logic issue |
| could then be filed, but will be lower-priority than addressing other open S0s |
| and S1s. |
| |
| --- |
| |
| ## Can Chrome Security help answer a question about a bug assigned to me? |
| |
| We're here to help, but please do not assign the bug to a Chrome Security team |
| member or security@chromium.org. Instead, reach out over chat to one of the |
| [current shepherds](http://go/current-security-shepherds) or email |
| security@chromium.org directly. |